OpenAI DotOpenAI Dot
OpenAI 官方的云端编码 agent:本机什么都不装,所有工作发生在 OpenAI 的云端机器上。官方给的能力边界写得很直白:
- 独立云端电脑
- 自带浏览器
- 插件接 4,000 多款应用
- 关机后仍在推进工作
Nothing installs locally; all work happens on OpenAI's cloud machine — the stated capability boundary is blunt: a standalone cloud computer plus its own browser plus plugins into 4,000+ apps, and it keeps progressing after you shut down.
适合与不适合When to use it, when not to
适合(官方自己给的场景,可直接当选型依据): 要的是「PR 交给你审、附演示视频」「产品范围变了发布材料自动跟上」 「新数据到了论文图表自己更新」这类跨工具、跨时段的活。
不适合: 想自己挑模型的人(模型被指定); 数据不能出本机的人(默认云端,只有授权后才碰本机); 要随时插手精细控制流的人(本机 IDE / CLI 形态更合适)。
Fits (scenarios the vendor itself gives, usable directly as selection criteria): work that is cross-tool and cross-time — "hand me the PR for review, with a demo video", "the product scope changed so the release materials keep up", "new data arrived so the paper's charts update themselves".
Not a fit for: people who want to pick the model themselves (the model is fixed); people whose data must not leave the machine (cloud by default, touching your machine only once authorised); people who want fine-grained control over the flow (the local IDE / CLI forms suit that better).
中文生态China availability 国产 / 国内可直接用 / 备案状态 · 快照domestic / direct access / CAC filing · snapshot 2026-10-20
- 出品属地Origin
- 国外出品foreign-made 国外主体(网信办公示名单未见对应备案主体)。foreign entity (no matching filing entity in the CAC registry).
- 国内使用Direct access
- 直连未核验direct unknown openai.com 对 curl 直连与代理都返回 403(反爬拦截),本方法无法判定可达性。openai.com returns 403 to curl both direct and proxied (anti-bot) — reachability cannot be judged by this method.
- 备案状态CAC filing
- 未见于备案名单not in filing list:未见于网信办公示名单(2026-10-20 检索 13 批附件,https://www.cac.gov.cn/2024-04/02/c_1713729983803145.htm);该产品未面向大陆公众提供服务,备案不适用。not in the CAC public registry (13 batch attachments searched 2026-10-20, https://www.cac.gov.cn/2024-04/02/c_1713729983803145.htm); the product does not serve the mainland public, so filing does not apply.
备案信息以网信办《生成式人工智能服务已备案信息》公示名单为准(按批次滚动更新,本站只抄编号不解读);「大陆可直连」是本站从大陆网络直连实测的结果,不是厂商承诺。GitHub 类站点当日实测有波动,口径写在依据里。Filing status is quoted from the CAC public registry (updated batch by batch; this site copies the number and does not interpret it). "Direct access" is this site's own reachability measurement from a mainland network, not a vendor promise. GitHub-hosted sites fluctuated on the measurement day — the note says so.
固定坐标系Fixed coordinate system
8 个维度dimensions, 与同分区其他对象逐项可比each comparable item by item against others in the same section.
- 模型与开放条件Model & openness
模型不是用户能选的,是厂商指定的 ——
官方发布页原文:「它们由 GPT‑6 Astra 驱动」。
即:Dot 跑在GPT-6 Astra 上,没有模型选择入口。
这与本分区的IDE / CLI 形态形成对照:那两类里模型通常可选, 厂商云形态把「选模型」这件事整个拿掉了。
The model is not user-selectable; it is vendor-assigned —
official launch-page wording: "powered by GPT-6 Astra" (translated).
i.e.: Dot runs on GPT-6 Astra, with no model-selection entry point.
This contrasts with the IDE / CLI forms in this section: there the model is usually selectable, while the vendor-cloud form takes the whole "pick a model" decision away.
- 运行位置Where it runs
形态的答案就是本产品:
官方原文:「拥有独立的云端电脑」,并有「自己的浏览器」, 且「你随时都能打开 dot 的电脑,检查它的工作」。
官方还写明另一种授权方式:「你也可以授权 Dot 连接并使用你自己的设备, 例如笔记本电脑,让它直接在你的工作环境中与你协作」——
所以 runtime 有两种:默认厂商云VM,可授权访问本机。
The answer to "what form is it" is the product itself:
official wording: "a separate computer in the cloud" (translated), with "its own browser" (translated), and "you can open the Dot's computer at any time to check its work" (translated).
The official pages also state another authorization mode: "you can also authorize Dot to connect to and use your own devices, e.g. a laptop, so it collaborates with you directly in your working environment" (translated) —
so runtime has two modes: the vendor cloud VM by default, with optional authorized access to your own machine.
- 本地文件Local files
默认完全隔离。官方原文: 「除非你选择连接自己的计算机,否则你的计算机及其中的内容始终与它隔离」。 Dot 的文件都在它自己的云端环境里。
授权连接本机后能做什么,官方安全文档给了具体例子(2026-10-03 补): 「你也可以选择连接自己的计算机,让 Dot 以更多方式提供帮助, 例如分析保存在桌面上的电子表格,或使用设备上安装的编程工具」。
即本机授权不是「打开文件权限」这一项, 而是桌面文件 + 设备上已装的开发工具两类。
云端工作空间内部还有一层沙盒: 「在每个 Dot 受保护的工作空间内,沙盒机制会限制该 Dot 可以访问的代码和工具, 帮助控制有害代码或错误命令的影响范围」。
多租户隔离也写明了:「将不同用户的云端环境彼此隔离」, 且「Dot 运行代码的环境,与协调其工作及执行关键防护措施的系统相互独立」。
⚠ 只读工具在已连接应用里究竟能读到什么程度,官方仍未给量化边界 (只给了「无法发送消息、更改应用内容」这类否定式描述)。
Fully isolated by default. Official wording (translated): "unless you choose to connect your own computer, your computer and its contents always remain isolated from it". Dot's files all live in its own cloud environment.
What it can do once authorized to connect locally — the official security document gives concrete examples (supplemented 2026-10-03, translated): "you can also choose to connect your own computer so Dot can help in more ways, e.g. analyzing a spreadsheet saved on your desktop, or using programming tools installed on the device".
So local authorization is not one "file access" toggle; it covers desktop files + development tools installed on the device.
Inside the cloud workspace there is another sandbox layer (translated): "within each Dot's protected workspace, sandboxing limits the code and tools that Dot can access, helping contain the blast radius of harmful code or mistaken commands".
Multi-tenant isolation is also stated (translated): "isolating different users' cloud environments from each other", and "the environment where Dot runs code is separate from the systems that coordinate its work and enforce key safeguards".
⚠ How far read-only tools can actually read inside connected apps still has no quantified official boundary (only negative descriptions like "cannot send messages or change app content").
- 关机后的任务Tasks after shutdown
这一维度的官方材料最完整,官方专门有整节讲: 「即使你没有直接与 Dot 互动,它也会在后台寻找能帮上忙的地方。 我们将其称为『主动研究』」。
官方还写明关闭应用后仍在继续推进工作, 以及「你的 Dot 可以接手项目并自主推进,即使它同时还在处理其他几个项目」。 多任务并行是官方明说的能力,不是推测。
工作空间是持续存在的:「每个 Dot 都有自己的云端计算机,可以在其中浏览网页、 分析信息、创建文件和运行工具。即使你没有主动参与, Dot 也能在这些工作空间中持续推进工作」。
⚠ 「主动研究」期间用的是只读工具 —— 官方原文: 「在此过程中,它会通过仅具备只读权限的工具访问你已连接的应用。 这些工具无法发送消息、更改应用内容,也无法控制你的浏览器或计算机」。
这行限定条件很重要:后台自主 ≠ 后台可改。 ⚠ 后台工作不是无条件跑下去的(2026-10-03 补): 官方安全文档明确监控可以在执行中暂停它 ——
「如果安全监控在 Dot 正在进行的工作中发现风险,它可以暂停该工作, 并向你显示警告」;发布页版本写的是「可以暂停或停止 Dot 的工作」。 所以「关机后仍在推进」的准确表述是:仍在推进,但可能中途被拦下。
This dimension is its strongest one; the official pages devote a whole section (translated): "even when you are not directly interacting with a Dot, it looks in the background for ways to help. We call this 'proactive research'."
The official pages also state work keeps progressing after you close the app, and "your Dot can pick up a project and drive it forward autonomously, even while it is juggling several others at the same time" (translated). Multi-task parallelism is an officially stated capability, not speculation.
Workspaces are persistent (translated): "each Dot has its own cloud computer where it can browse the web, analyze information, create files and run tools. Even when you are not actively involved, Dots can keep work moving forward in these workspaces".
⚠ During "proactive research" it uses read-only tools — official wording (translated): "in doing so it accesses your connected apps through tools with read-only permissions. These tools cannot send messages, change app content, or control your browser or computer".
This qualifier matters: background autonomy ≠ background write access. ⚠ Background work does not run unconditionally (supplemented 2026-10-03): the official security document states monitoring can pause it mid-execution —
"if safety monitoring detects risk in work a Dot is doing, it can pause that work and show you a warning" (translated); the launch-page version says "can pause or stop a Dot's work" (translated). So the accurate statement of "keeps going after shutdown" is: keeps going, but may be intercepted mid-way.
- 工具与扩展Tools & extensions
插件生态是核心卖点,官方原文「通过我们的插件生态, 它们可以轻松连接 4,000 多款应用」。
官方明确说应用来源是「你已连接的应用」, 且内置了应用控制选项来管理权限。
另有:可把编码类任务交给 Codex(DevDay 上Codex 本身也宣布云端化); 正与 Microsoft合作把专职 Dot 接进 Agent 365 的治理与安全控制。
The plugin ecosystem is the core selling point; official wording (translated): "through our plugin ecosystem, they can easily connect to more than 4,000 apps".
The official pages state the app source is "apps you have connected", with built-in app controls to manage permissions.
Also: coding tasks can be handed to Codex (at DevDay, Codex itself was also announced going cloud); working with Microsoft to bring dedicated Dots into Agent 365 governance and security controls.
- 上下文与记忆Context & memory
跨渠道保留上下文 —— 官方原文: 「dot 会在各个渠道间保留上下文,因此无论你通过哪个渠道联系它, 它都能掌握完整的上下文信息」。
渠道含:
- ChatGPT(桌面/网页/移动)
- Slack
- Teams
- 短信(官方写「即将推出」)
- 语音通话
跨渠道共享的载体官方写明了是「项目」: 「你可以在 ChatGPT 中启动项目,通过 Slack 与负责该项目的团队共享上下文, 再让 dot 继续推进工作」——
即上下文挂在项目上而不是挂在某个渠道上,这是它能跨渠道的机制前提。
官方强调学习机制:「能在长期使用中从反馈里学习」「合作越多, Dot 就越了解你的偏好、思考方式,以及你心目中好工作的标准」。
⚠ 训练数据默认不用于改进模型,但有一条重要例外(2026-10-03 补, 旧版档案漏了这条):官方原文「默认情况下,我们不会使用 ChatGPT Business、Enterprise 或 Edu 工作空间中的内容来改进模型」。
限定在三个工作空间档位——按发布页字面, 个人档与 Pro 档的去向官方在此页没有同样的表述, 这三档之间是否存在差异,官方页面未说明。不要把「不用来训练」推广到所有档位。
上下文窗口大小与记忆存储实现,官方两个页面均未给数字。
Context persists across channels — official wording (translated): "dots keep context across channels, so whichever channel you reach them through, they have the full picture".
Channels include:
- ChatGPT (desktop/web/mobile)
- Slack
- Teams
- SMS (officially "coming soon")
- Voice calls
The carrier of cross-channel sharing is stated officially as "projects" (translated): "you can start a project in ChatGPT, share context with the team on that project via Slack, and let the dot keep the work moving" —
i.e. context hangs on the project rather than on a channel, which is the mechanistic precondition for going cross-channel.
The official pages stress the learning mechanism: "learns from feedback over long use"; "the more you work together, the more Dot understands your preferences, how you think, and what you consider good work" (translated).
⚠ Training data is not used to improve models by default, but there is one important exception (supplemented 2026-10-03, previously missed in this dossier): official wording (translated) "by default, we do not use content from ChatGPT Business, Enterprise or Edu workspaces to improve our models".
The statement is scoped to three workspace tiers — per the launch page wording, for personal and Pro tiers this page gives no equivalent statement, and whether the tiers differ is not explained on the official pages. Do not generalize "not used for training" to all tiers.
Context-window size and memory storage implementation — neither official page gives numbers.
- 权限与限制Permissions & limits
本档案权限信息最完整的一份,官方有独立两节。
分三层:
① 自定义规则 —— 官方原文:「通过自定义规则,你可以允许特定操作、 要求先获批准,或禁止这些操作」,且「内置安全要求始终有效」 (即自定义规则只能在官方底线之上收紧,不能放松);
② 自动审核 —— 「对于可能影响你的账户或分享信息的操作,Dot 会通过自动审核」, 官方说明审核判据是「是否符合你的指令、自定义规则和安全要求」, 且明确「更改密码等特定敏感任务始终需要由你亲自完成」;
③ 凭据隔离 —— 「登录受支持的网站时,Dot 可以使用已保存的密码, 而无需向模型透露这些密码」。
④ 运行期监控会真的拦下来(2026-10-03 补,旧版档案缺这一层): 官方安全文档写「我们还会在 Dot 规划和执行操作时进行监控, 查找潜在有害行为,例如超出你的指令范围,或试图绕过防护措施。
如果安全监控在 Dot 正在进行的工作中发现风险,它可以暂停该工作, 并向你显示警告,供你查看」。
这是「审核」与「执行」分离的实证 —— 不是只在动作前拦, 也能在执行中停下。
这是它与 Meta Muse「审批交给另一个 agent」最接近的一层, 但官方未说明这个监控器是否独立于模型(Muse 明写了 Sentinel 系统级隔离, Dot 没写)—— 这一项不要替它补。
审计面:官方提供活动视图(activity view)可跟进进度含后台工作。
⚠ 官方同一页也写了「Dot 仍可能出错,因此,请务必检查可能产生重要影响的工作成果」。
This dossier has the most complete permission information of the three; the official pages have two dedicated sections.
Three layers:
① Custom rules — official wording (translated): "with custom rules you can allow specific actions, require approval first, or block them", and "built-in safety requirements always apply" (i.e. custom rules can only tighten above the official floor, never loosen it);
② Automated review — "for actions that could affect your account or share information, Dot runs automated review" (translated), the official criteria being "whether it matches your instructions, custom rules and safety requirements", and it explicitly states "certain sensitive tasks like changing passwords always require you personally" (translated);
③ Credential isolation — "when logging into supported sites, Dot can use saved passwords without revealing them to the model" (translated).
④ Runtime monitoring really does intervene (supplemented 2026-10-03; this layer was previously missing): the official security document states (translated) "we also monitor Dot as it plans and executes actions, looking for potentially harmful behavior, e.g. going beyond your instructions or attempting to bypass safeguards.
If safety monitoring detects risk in work a Dot is doing, it can pause that work and show you a warning for you to review".
This is evidence of "review" and "execution" being separated — it does not only gate before actions; it can also stop mid-execution.
This is the layer closest to Meta Muse's "approval handed to another agent", but the official pages never state whether this monitor is independent of the model (Muse explicitly states Sentinel system-level isolation; Dot does not) — do not fill this in for them.
Audit surface: the official pages provide an activity view to follow progress including background work.
⚠ The same official page also states "Dots can still make mistakes, so be sure to check work products that could have significant consequences" (translated).
- 适合什么任务Best for
官方给的是岗位化场景,值得直接抄成选型依据:
- 把反馈转成经过测试的修复(交完整 PR 附演示视频)
- 产品范围变化时调整发布方案
- 拿到新证据后重跑分析并更新论文图表
- 销售提案随需求变化更新
- 内容制作自动完成
反过来说它不适合:要自己挑模型的人;数据不能出本机的人; 需要随时接管的精细控制流(本机 IDE/CLI 形态更合适)。
What the official pages give are role-based scenarios, worth copying directly as a selection basis (translated):
- turning feedback into tested fixes (delivering a full PR with a demo video)
- adjusting release plans when product scope changes
- re-running analyses and updating paper figures when new evidence arrives
- keeping sales proposals updated as requirements change
- content production running automatically
Conversely it does not fit: people who want to pick their own model; people whose data cannot leave the machine; people needing fine-grained control with takeover at any moment (local IDE/CLI forms fit better).
头号误解Top misconception
- 把「主动研究」理解成后台可以随便改你的东西 —— 官方限定那是只读工具Reading "proactive research" as background access to change your things — the official docs limit it to read-only tools
- 以为自定义规则能放宽官方限制 —— 官方明确「内置安全要求始终有效」Assuming custom rules can relax the official limits — the docs state built-in safety requirements always apply
- 把 Dot 当独立产品去订阅 —— 它是 Pro / Business Premium 附带的权益Treating Dot as a standalone product to subscribe to — it comes with Pro / Business Premium
- 以为 Enterprise 默认可用 —— 官方明确默认关闭、需工作空间管理员启用Assuming it is on by default in Enterprise — the docs say it is off by default and a workspace admin must enable it
- 把「内容不用于训练」推广到所有档位 —— 官方只点了 Business / Enterprise / EduGeneralising "content is not used for training" to every tier — the docs name Business / Enterprise / Edu only
- 以为后台工作会一直跑到底 —— 官方明写安全监控可在执行中暂停它Assuming background work runs to completion — the docs state safety monitoring can pause it mid-run
未知项清单Known unknowns
- 上下文窗口大小与记忆的具体实现
- 「主动研究」的触发条件与频率
- 已连接应用在只读工具下究竟能读到什么程度(官方只给否定式描述)
- 安全监控系统的检出率 / 误报率(官方只写「红队测试」,无数字)
- 运行期监控器是否独立于模型(Muse 明写 Sentinel 隔离,Dot 未说明)
- 「不用客户内容改进模型」是否也覆盖个人档与 Pro 档(官方只点了 Business/Enterprise/Edu)
- 不同地区/账号的 rollout 差异
- Context-window size and the concrete implementation of memory
- Trigger conditions and frequency of "proactive research"
- How far connected apps can actually be read under read-only tools (official pages give only negative descriptions)
- Detection rate / false-positive rate of the safety monitoring system (official pages only mention "red-teaming", no numbers)
- Whether the runtime monitor is independent of the model (Muse states Sentinel isolation; Dot does not state)
- Whether "customer content is not used to improve models" also covers the personal and Pro tiers (official pages only name Business/Enterprise/Edu)
- Rollout differences by region/account
证据来源Evidence sources
判断可回到以下一手源复核。本站核验日Every judgement can be rechecked against the primary sources below. Verified on 2026-10-23,内容更新日content updated on 2026-10-03。
| 类型Type | 名称Name | 链接Link |
|---|---|---|
| official | OpenAI · Introducing Dot(官方发布页,2026-09-29,正文 5,166 字逐节取)OpenAI · Introducing Dot (official launch page, 2026-09-29, body of 5,166 words captured section by section) | https://openai.com/index/introducing-dots/ |
| official | OpenAI · 我们如何将安全性、信息安全和隐私保护融入 Dot(官方安全文档,2026-10-03 取到正文:沙盒机制 / 多租户隔离 / 执行环境与防护系统分离 / 运行期监控可暂停工作 / 授权本机后分析桌面表格 / prompt injection 官方承认)OpenAI · How we build safety, security and privacy into Dots (official security document, full body captured 2026-10-03: sandboxing / multi-tenant isolation / execution environment separated from safeguards / runtime monitoring can pause work / analyzing desktop spreadsheets after local authorization / official prompt-injection acknowledgment) | https://openai.com/index/how-we-build-safety-security-and-privacy-into-dots/ |
| official | OpenAI · DevDay 2026 回顾(Dots 的方案范围与 Enterprise beta 状态)OpenAI · DevDay 2026 recap (Dots plan scope and Enterprise beta status) | https://openai.com/index/devday-2026-recap |
| changelog | OpenAI · 产品发布记录(Product News and Updates,2026-09-29「隆重推出 Dot」)OpenAI · Product release notes (Product News and Updates, 2026-09-29 "Introducing Dot") | https://help.openai.com/en/articles/6825453-chatgpt-release-notes |
实测记录Measured runs
本档未跑端到端编码任务;能力结论来自官方文档,编码向测量协议见 protocols/coding/_protocol.md。
实测建议:这三份厂商云 agent 的比较维度集中在 background 与 permissions, 本地装不了(要 Pro / Business Premium 订阅),
所以实测要靠「关掉客户端后它是否还在动」这种外部观察, 而不是本地基准。
- 形态与额度口径已核验,不必重复测。
This site has not completed measured runs. The test protocol is at protocols/coding/_protocol.md.
Suggested measurement: the comparison dimensions of these three vendor-cloud agents concentrate in background and permissions; they cannot be installed locally (requires a Pro / Business Premium subscription),
so measurement must rely on external observation like "is it still moving after I close the client", not local benchmarks.
- Form factor and quota accounting are verified; no need to re-test.
与本分区另两组形态的根本差别The fundamental difference from the other two form groups in this section
它走的是厂商云形态:任务提交后可在关机后继续推进,不和 IDE 或 CLI 比功能多少。
| IDE 形态 / CLI 形态 | 厂商云形态(本条目) | |
|---|---|---|
| 装在哪 | 你本机 | 厂商的云VM |
| 模型谁能选 | 通常可选 | 厂商指定(GPT‑6 Astra) |
| 关机后 | 停 | 继续跑 |
| 本地文件 | 直接读写 | 默认隔离,需显式授权连接本机 |
| 审批 | 在对话/终端里逐次确认 | 自定义规则 + 自动审核 + 敏感动作永远人工 |
所以它不可替代的地方不是「功能更多」,是「你本机不在线时它也在干活」。
This is not "yet another AI coding tool" but a different direction:
| IDE form / CLI form | Vendor-cloud form (this entry) | |
|---|---|---|
| Installed where | your machine | the vendor's cloud VM |
| Who picks the model | usually selectable | vendor-assigned (GPT-6 Astra) |
| After shutdown | stops | keeps running |
| Local files | direct read/write | isolated by default; connecting locally needs explicit authorization |
| Approval | confirmed case by case in the chat/terminal | custom rules + automated review + sensitive actions always human |
So its irreplaceable point is not "more features" but "it works even when your machine is offline".
后台自主 ≠ 后台可改(这一条最容易被误读)Background autonomy ≠ background write access (the easiest point to misread)
官方有整节讲后台行为,值得原样引用:
即使你没有直接与 Dot 互动,它也会在后台寻找能帮上忙的地方。
我们将其称之"主动研究"。在此过程中,它会通过仅具备只读权限的工具
访问你已连接的应用。这意味着这些工具无法发送消息、更改应用内容,
也无法控制你的浏览器或计算机。
限定条件写得很清楚:后台自主动作拿到的是只读工具。
换句话说:「它在我不在时自己干活」成立;「它在我不在时替我发消息、改内容」不成立。 本站此前若把它理解成后者,那是把官方那一行限定读漏了。
The official pages devote a whole section to background behavior, worth quoting in full (the source quotes it as a Chinese translation of the official English; rendered back with the (translated) marker):
Even when you are not directly interacting with a Dot, it looks in the background
for ways to help. We call this "proactive research". In doing so, it accesses your
connected apps through tools with read-only permissions. That means these tools
cannot send messages, change app content, or control your browser or computer.
(translated)
The qualifier is stated clearly: background autonomous actions get read-only tools.
Put differently: "it works on its own while I am away" holds; "it sends messages or changes content on my behalf while I am away" does not. If this site previously understood it as the latter, that was reading past the official one-line qualifier.
权限:三层,其中一层是官方底线Permissions: three layers, one of which is the official floor
官方把权限拆成明确的三块,这对做选型很有用(可逐层对照,不用猜):
| 层 | 官方原文要点 | 你能收紧到多紧 |
|---|---|---|
| 自定义规则 | 「你可以允许特定操作、要求先获批准,或禁止这些操作」 | 完全由你定 |
| 内置安全要求 | 「内置安全要求始终有效」 | 底线,你的规则只能在这之上收紧 |
| 自动审核 | 「通过自动审核,检查其是否符合你的指令、自定义规则和安全要求」 | 判定依据含上述三者 |
以及一条硬边界:
更改密码等特定敏感任务始终需要由你亲自完成。
「自定义规则只能在官方底线之上收紧,不能放松」是这一层里最有价值的信息 —— 意味着配规则时不必担心自己配松了,官方有兜底。
The official pages split permissions into three explicit blocks, which is useful for selection (compare layer by layer, no guessing):
| Layer | Key official wording (translated) | How tight can you set it |
|---|---|---|
| Custom rules | "you can allow specific actions, require approval first, or block them" | entirely yours |
| Built-in safety requirements | "built-in safety requirements always apply" | the floor; your rules can only tighten above it |
| Automated review | "automated review checks whether it matches your instructions, custom rules and safety requirements" | criteria include all three above |
Plus one hard boundary:
Certain sensitive tasks like changing passwords always require you personally. (translated)
"Custom rules can only tighten above the official floor, never loosen it" is the most valuable information in this layer — it means when configuring rules you need not worry about setting them too loose; the vendor has a backstop.
凭据:不向模型暴露密码Credentials: passwords never exposed to the model
登录受支持的网站时,Dot 可以使用已保存的密码,
而无需向模型透露这些密码。
这与 Meta Muse 的 Secure Credentials Store 是同一类设计: 凭据交给「保管处」,模型只拿到「用凭据做完这件事的权限」。 两边都独立地采用了这个模式,值得单独记一笔—— 厂商对agent 凭据的共识正在收敛。
When logging into supported sites, Dot can use saved passwords
without revealing them to the model. (translated)
This is the same design family as Meta Muse's Secure Credentials Store: credentials go to a "vault"; the model only gets "permission to finish this task with the credentials". Both vendors independently adopted this pattern, worth noting — vendor consensus on agent credentials is converging.
计费:一句话,但有个坑Billing: one sentence, but with a trap
Pro 或 Business Premium 套餐已包含你的首个 Dot,无需额外付费。
但同一页有两条容易漏的限定:
| 场景 | 是否计入 ChatGPT 使用额度 |
|---|---|
| 与 Dot 自己的对话 | 不计入(官方原文:「与 Dot 的对话不会占用你的 ChatGPT 使用额度」) |
| Dot 在 Codex / ChatGPT 工作中启动或管理的任务 | 照常计入 |
即:Dot 自己跟你聊天免费,但它替你派出去的活儿照常算钱。
另外 Enterprise(含 Edu / Healthcare)默认关闭,需工作空间管理员启用 beta。
Your first Dot is included with Pro or Business Premium plans, at no extra cost. (translated)
But the same page has two easy-to-miss qualifiers:
| Scenario | Counted against ChatGPT usage quota? |
|---|---|
| Chats with the Dot itself | not counted (official wording translated: "conversations with Dot do not use your ChatGPT usage limits") |
| Tasks a Dot starts or manages inside Codex / ChatGPT work | counted as usual |
i.e.: chatting with your Dot is free, but the work it dispatches on your behalf is billed as usual.
Also, Enterprise (incl. Edu / Healthcare) is off by default; workspace admins must enable the beta.
采集限制Collection limitations
| 页面 | 状态 |
|---|---|
| Introducing Dot 发布页 | ✅ Playwright 渲染取到 5,166 字,八维度均从正文取证 |
| DevDay 2026 回顾 | ✅ 取到(Dots 的方案范围、Enterprise beta 默认关闭) |
| 帮助中心发布记录 | ✅ 取到(23 万字,确认 2026-09-29 发布条目) |
| Dot 安全文档 · how-we-build-safety | ✅ 2026-10-03 取到整页正文,补齐 local_files / background / permissions 三维 |
⚠ confidence 仍为 partial,但缺口已经收窄到两类: 补核验前是「安全文档完全没读到」; 现在安全机制的实现路径已拿到(沙盒 / 隔离 / 运行期监控 / 执行环境分离),
剩下这两类官方确实没给: ① 量化指标(监测系统检出率、误报率、只读工具的读取边界); ② 上下文窗口大小与记忆存储实现。
另有两条「官方未说明是否如此」需要保留为未知: 运行期监控器是否独立于模型、训练数据不用于改进的表述是否覆盖个人档与 Pro 档。
| Page | Status |
|---|---|
| Introducing Dot launch page | ✅ Playwright rendered capture of 5,166 words; all eight dimensions evidenced from the body |
| DevDay 2026 recap | ✅ captured (Dots plan scope, Enterprise beta off by default) |
| Help Center release notes | ✅ captured (230k words, confirming the 2026-09-29 launch entry) |
| Dot security document · how-we-build-safety | ✅ full page body captured 2026-10-03, filling the local_files / background / permissions dimensions |
⚠ Confidence remains partial, but the gaps have narrowed to two classes: before the supplement it was "the security document was never read"; now the implementation path of the safety mechanisms is in hand (sandbox / isolation / runtime monitoring / execution-environment separation),
and what remains genuinely absent from the official pages is: ① quantified metrics (detection rate and false-positive rate of the monitoring system, read boundaries of read-only tools); ② context-window size and memory storage implementation.
Two more "the official pages do not say whether this is the case" items must stay unknown: whether the runtime monitor is independent of the model, and whether the "content not used to improve models" statement covers the personal and Pro tiers.
安全文档给出的三条硬机制(旧版档案缺这一整块)Three hard mechanisms from the security document (this whole block was previously missing)
这一版补核验最大的收获,是找到了那份安全文档本身。它给了三条可核对的机制:
| 机制 | 官方原话要点 |
|---|---|
| 工作空间沙盒 | 「沙盒机制会限制该 Dot 可以访问的代码和工具,帮助控制有害代码或错误命令的影响范围」 |
| 多租户隔离 | 「将不同用户的云端环境彼此隔离」 |
| 执行与防护分离 | 「Dot 运行代码的环境,与协调其工作及执行关键防护措施的系统相互独立」 |
第三条与 Meta Muse 的 Sentinel 是同一类设计取向 —— 两家都把关键防护放到模型之外。这不是巧合,是厂商云 agent 的一个共同收敛点。
另外官方自己承认了 prompt injection 的存在与缓解方式: 「网页、电子邮件或文档中可能包含恶意指令,试图改变智能体的行动方向 或诱使其分享私密信息,这类问题称为提示词注入。 我们将模型防护措施与工具限制、操作前检查和监控相结合」。
注意这份文档也留了一手:「人工和自动化红队测试帮助我们发现弱点、 改进模型及其周边系统,并对这些改进再次进行测试」—— 官方没给任何检出率数字,所以上面 ① 类缺口是官方确实未披露,不是本站没找到。
The biggest gain of this supplemental verification was finding the security document itself. It gives three checkable mechanisms:
| Mechanism | Key official wording (translated) |
|---|---|
| Workspace sandbox | "sandboxing limits the code and tools that Dot can access, helping contain the blast radius of harmful code or mistaken commands" |
| Multi-tenant isolation | "isolating different users' cloud environments from each other" |
| Execution separated from safeguards | "the environment where Dot runs code is separate from the systems that coordinate its work and enforce key safeguards" |
The third is the same design orientation as Meta Muse's Sentinel — both vendors place key safeguards outside the model. This is not coincidence; it is a shared convergence point of vendor-cloud agents.
The official pages also acknowledge prompt injection and its mitigations (translated): "webpages, emails or documents may contain malicious instructions attempting to redirect the agent's actions or trick it into sharing private information — a problem called prompt injection. We combine model-level protections with tool restrictions, pre-action checks and monitoring".
Note this document also holds back: "human and automated red-teaming help us find weaknesses, improve the model and the systems around it, and test those improvements again" — no detection-rate numbers are given anywhere, so gap ① above is genuinely undisclosed by the vendor, not something this site failed to find.
相关条目Related entries
- Meta MuseMeta Muse同期发布,凭据隔离机制几乎同构,可对照看released the same period, credential-isolation mechanisms nearly isomorphic — worth comparing side by side
- xAI Grok BotxAI Grok Bot同期发布,第三方官方页可核对released the same period, the third vendor's official pages are checkable
- CodexCodex (IDE extension)Dot 可把编码类任务交给它Dot can hand coding tasks to it
- CursorCursor本地 IDE 形态的对照项(机器归你)the local-IDE-form contrast (the machine is yours)
- Playwright MCP ServerPlaywright MCP Server另一层 · MCP 工具Other layer · MCP tools
本页由This page is generated from the ai-handbook 数据层生成(CC BY 4.0)。data layer (CC BY 4.0).
方法论与坐标系定义见仓库内For the methodology and coordinate definitions, see METHODOLOGY.md.